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I. INTRODUCTION
Several recent United States Supreme Court decisions have
struck down certain summary creditor remedies as violative of
due process for failure to provide the debtor with an opportunity
for a hearing prior to a final determination of his rights. These
decisions suggest that the Minnesota statute governing cancella-
tion of contracts for deed' is unconstitutional. The statute pre-
scribes a summary extrajudicial method for termination of the
property interest of a defaulting vendee, a method which makes
no provision for a hearing at which the vendee can present a de-
fense to his default before he is deprived of his property rights.
Moreover, the Minnesota Supreme Court has applied the statute
to the defrauded vendee in a way which denies him both the
right to recover for his injury and the right to assert vendor
fraud as a defense to his default at any subsequent hearing. The
purpose of this Note is to discuss the constitutional issues in the
context of the defrauded vendee and to propose several ways to
save the constitutionality of the statutory cancellation procedure.
II. BACKGROUND
Prior to the creation of the statutory procedure for cancella-
tion of contracts for deed,2 the provisions of the contract were
controlling in the event of a breach. If time was of the essence
of the contract, the vendor could cancel it in the manner pro-
vided by its terms.3 Thus, if the contract was silent on notice to
a defaulting vendee, he might unknowingly forfeit all rights as
of the day of the breach.4 If time was not of the essence of the
contract, the vendor had to notify the vendee of the breach and
1. MtN nv. STAT. § 559.21 (1971).
2. Chapter 223 of the Laws of 1897 was the precursor of MNN.
STAT. § 559.21 (1971).
3. True v. Northern Pac. Ry., 126 Minn. 72, 147 N.W. 948 (1914);
Johnson v. Eklund, 72 Minn. 195, 75 N.W. 14 (1898). See Ballantine,
Forfeiture for Breach of Contract, 5 MiNN. L. REv. 329, 345 (1921).
4. See, e.g., Graceville State Bank v. Hofschild, 166 Minn. 58, 61,
206 N.W. 948, 949 (1926).
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allow a reasonable time for performance before he could cancel
the contract.5
In an equitable action to foreclose a land contract, the court
could allow either a strict foreclosure or a foreclosure by sale.,
In a strict foreclosure, the court generally provided a period ex-
ceeding 30 days in which the vendee could rectify the default.'
Originally such an extension was merely discretionary, but later
it became a right of the defaulting vendee."
The vagaries of contractual provisions and the inconsistent
application of common law equity often treated the vendee rude-
ly.9 Chapter 223 was passed in 1897 to afford relief against the
harshness of the common law rule which permitted the vendor
to terminate the contract immediately upon default by the ven-
dee.' 0  The statute provides one uniform method of vendee no-
tice and subsequent cancellation:
When default is made in the conditions of any contract for
the conveyance of real estate or any interest therein, whereby
the vendor has a right to terminate the same, he may do so by
serving upon the purchaser, his personal representatives or
assigns, either within or without the state, a notice specifying
the conditions in which default has been made, and stating that
such contract will terminate 30 days after the service of such
notice unless prior thereto the purchaser shall comply with such
conditions and pay the costs of service .... Such notice must
be given notwithstanding any provisions in the contract to the
contrary .... 11
5. See, e.g., Id.; Austin v. Wacks, 30 Minn. 335, 15 N.W. 409 (1883).
6. See Vanneman, Strict Foreclosure on Land Contracts, 14 MINI.
L. REv. 342, 344 (1930).
7. See, e.g., Eberlein v. Randall, 99 Minn. 528, 109 N.W. 1133
(1906) (90 days); London & Northwest Am. Mortgage Co. v. McMillan,
78 Minn. 53, 80 N.W. 841 (1899) (90 days); Drew v. Smith, 7 Minn.
301 (1862) (six months).
8. Drew v. Smith, 7 Minn. 301 (1862).
9. Compare Melco Inv. Co. v. Gapp, 259 Minn. 82, 105 N.W.2d 907
(1960) (cancellation pursuant to the notice requirements of the stat-
ute) with True v. Northern Pac. Ry., 126 Minn. 72, 147 N.W. 948 (1914)
and Johnson v. Eklund, 72 Minn. 195, 75 N.W. 14 (1898).
10. Needles v. Keys, 149 Minn. 477, 184 N.W. 33 (1921). The stat-
ute's
primary purpose . . . is to prevent the vendor taking advan-
tage, through a provision in the contract, or otherwise, of the
vendee's failure to make payments on time or of other defaults,
and depriving him of his rights in the property without a defi-
nite notice of cancellation.
Mathwig v. Ostrand, 132 Minn. 346, 348, 157 N.W. 589 (1916).
The Iowa supreme court said a bit more lyrically that a similar
Iowa statute "is a merciful provision . . . extending a little grace to
a party in default who may be staggering under the load of his un-
dertaking." Waters v. Pearson, 163 Iowa 391, 397, 144 N.W. 1026, 1029
(1914).
11. MUNN. STAT. § 559.21 (1971) (emphasis added).
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This procedure allows a vendor to cancel a contract for deed
without recourse to the courts. The vendee is protected from
cancellation for nonpayment, however, since the statute pro-
vides that the contract will be reinstated if the vendee makes
up the default before expiration of the 30-day period.?2  If the
vendor chooses to cancel under the statute, he retains any pay-
ments already made by the vendee'3 but loses the chance he
would have in court to recover those payments which are in de-
fault.14
Rather than using statutory cancellation for vendee default,
the vendor may pursue an action for specific performance,1"
rescission,1 6 strict foreclosure 1 or damages for breach of con-
12. Thus, in Needles v. Keys, 149 Min. 477, 184 N.W. 33 (1921),
the vendee was protected against oppressive provisions of the contract
which gave the vendor the option to declare the entire balance due and
payable upon default by the vendee. The vendor exercised this elec-
tion and shortly thereafter served the statutory notice claiming the bal-
ance due as the default. In holding that the payment of only past due
installments was effective to reinstate the contract, the court said:
We think the legislature did not intend to permit [vendor],
by his own act, to add to the conditions which the vendee must
perform to cure his default and save his equitable rights. We
think that the legislature intended that the contract should not
be forfeited if, within the prescribed time, the vendee removed
such defaults as were made grounds of forfeiture by the terms
of the contract itself. And we hold that in proceedings under
this statute, the vendor cannot, by exercising an option to
declare deferred instalments due immediately, require the ven-
dee to pay such deferred instalments or forfeit his contract.
Id. at 480, 184 N.W. at 34 (emphasis added). Of course, if the contract
calls for both installment payments and the assumption of a mortgage,
the vendee's attempt to reinstate the contract by remitting only the
past due installment(s) will fail unless the vendor has waived the
mortgage payment(s). Compare Odegaard v. Moe, 264 Minn. 324, 119
N.W.2d 281 (1962) (vendor waiver of compliance with notice of
mortgage default) with Swanson v. Miller, 189 Minn. 158, 248 N.W. 727
(1933) (no vendor waiver).
13. Nelson Real Estate Agency v. Seeman, 147 Minn. 354, 180 N.W.
227 (1920).
14. Accord, Wayzata Enterprises, Inc. v. Herman, 268 Minn. 117,
128 N.W.2d 156 (1964); Smith v. Dristig, 176 Minn. 601, 224 N.W. 157
(1929). Compare Andresen v. Simon, 171 Minn. 168, 213 N.W. 563
(1927), with Moorehead Inv. Co. v. Carlson, 177 Minn. 174, 224 N.W.
842 (1929).
15. See, e.g., Robitshek v. Maetzold, 198 Minn. 586, 270 N.W. 579
(1936); Stacey v. Taylor, 196 Minn. 202, 264 N.W. 809 (1936); Nelson
Real Estate Agency v. Seeman, 147 Minn. 354, 180 N.W. 227 (1920);
Mathwig v. Ostrand, 132 Minn. 346, 157 N.W. 589 (1916).
16. See, e.g., Hunter v. Holmes, 60 Milnn. 496, 62 N.W. 1131
(1895).




tract.'8 However, statutory cancellation is a form of self-help
which provides the one remedy whereby the vendor can avoid
the time and expense of a judicial proceeding. As a result, the
statute is used by vendors more than any other remedy, and its
greater convenience and simplified procedure account for the
virtual disappearance of the old foreclosure proceedings.
III. APPLICATION OF THE STATUTE TO
THE DEFRAUDED VENDEE
A. THE OLSON RULE
The natural reaction of a vendee who thinks he has been de-
frauded is to stop payment on his contract. Under Minnesota
law, such a reaction has dire consequences. It makes no differ-
ence whether the vendee intended by his "default" to rescind
the contract or merely to recover from the vendor the amount
of damages suffered. 19 In either case, if the vendor subsequently
serves the statutory notice and the contract is thereby termi-
nated, the vendee's right of action for rescission or damages
arising from fraud is defeated.
This remedial abridgement was first dictated in Olson v.
Northern Pacific Ry.,20 where the vendee sought damages for
the vendor's misrepresentation concerning the quality and char-
acter of the land involved. The court held that because the con-
tract had been terminated under the statute,2' the vendee could
not maintain a damage action for fraudulent representation.
Key to the decision was the conclusion that "[the vendee] has
no contract upon which to predicate damages. '"2 2 This conclusion,
18. See, e.g., Kelley v. Olson, 272 Minn. 134, 136 N.W.2d 621 (1965);
Costello v. Johnson, 265 Minn. 204, 121 N.W.2d 70 (1963) ; Home Counsel-
lors, Inc. v. Folta, 246 Minn. 481, 75 N.W.2d 417 (1956); Wilson v. Hoy,
120 Minn. 451, 139 N.W. 817 (1913). If the vendor retains the land, the
measure of damages is the difference between market value and con-
tract price, plus vendor's expense of performance, minus sums already
paid by vendee.
19. As noted in Blosick v. Warmbold, 151 Minn. 264, 187 N.W. 136
(1922), vendee rescission prior to the service of notice is effective to ex-
tinguish the contract. However, if the defrauded vendee withholds
payments to effect rescission, the contract can be terminated under the
statute.
20. 126 Minn. 229, 148 N.W. 67 (1914).
21. The vendee was almost three years in default on the annual
payments when the statutory notice was served. This damage action
was brought on the 29th day of the running of the statute. No pay-
ments were made prior to the expiration of the 30 days.




of course, assumes first that termination of the contract under the
statute is tantamount to rescission of the contract and second that
an action for fraud must be based upon the contract and cannot
exist independently in tort.
The assumption that termination under the statute is equiv-
alent to a rescission of the contract is questionable." The effect
of rescission is to consider the contract as not having existed,
and the result of rescission is to place the parties in their pre-con-
tract positions.2 4  The Olson court insisted that there was no
contract upon which to base an action for fraud, but also al-
lowed the vendor to retain all payments received under the
terms of the contract. If the contract is deemed a nullity, it
seems inconsistent to award the seller something akin to liqui-
dated damages for default by the vendee. The parties should in-
stead be returned to the status quo ante.
2 5
Even if one assumes that the contract cannot survive statu-
tory cancellation, this assumption does not lead inevitably to
the conclusion that a fraud action is thereby lost. The majority
in Olson reasoned that the vendee, by eschewing the remedy of
rescission in favor of a damage action, had attempted to affirm
a contract which was no longer in existence and therefore was
23. See Comment, 8 MNm. L. REv. 163 (1923) for a discussion of
the difference between termination and rescission.
24. [Vendee] could rescind and recover what he had parted
with, or he could retain what he obtained and recover dam-
ages for its being of less value than the amount paid or agreed
to be paid therefor. Choosing the first means wiping out the
contract frm its inception, while proceeding under the second
is a binding determination to abide by the contract in all its
terms except that the consideration paid or agreed to be paid
may, in effect, be lessened by the amount of the recovery. The
two remedies are inconsistent, therefore the selection of one
will not entitle the vendee in that proceeding to recover what
might have been obtained under the other.
Olson v. Northern Pac. Ry., 126 Minn. 229, 230, 148 N.W. 67, 68 (1914)
(emphasis added).
25. By electing statutory cancellation, the vendor pursues "re-
scission" rather than an action for damages or one for specific perform-
ance. Under the Olson rule, however, the vendor retains all payments
made under the contract irrespective of either the actual damages suf-
fered from vendee default or the fair rental value of the land during
the vendee's possession. It is said in 12 S. WmLisToN, CoNTcrA §
1454 (3d ed. 1970):
The normal redress for a tort is to give what will restore
the injured party to as good a position as he had before the
tort. Where a contract has been broken, it is possible to approxi-
mate the redress given in tort actions by giving the injured
party the value of the performance rendered by him and re-
ceived by the other party.
This... form of redress is allowed in the law of contracts
as an alternative remedy to an action for breach of contract.
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barred from a fraud recovery because he could have removed the
default and kept the contract in force. However, Justice Brown
pointed out in a well-reasoned dissent that affirmance of the con-
tract was not affirmance of the fraud and that the procedural
niceties of affirmance versus disaffirmance should not be deter-
minative of the fraud action.26 The cause of action arises from
the deceit practiced at the inception of the contract, not from
the contract itself.27 Moreover, where a contract has been pro-
cured through fraud, if the vendor is permitted to cancel the con-
tract under the authority of the statute or of the stipulations in
the contract itself and the vendee is denied an independent cause
of action, the vendor thereby secures immunity for the fraud he
has committed. The law should deny to a wrongdoer the right
to gain any advantage for himself. Justice Stone urged in a later
case that the independent cause of action in tort should not be
denied:
It is wrong to treat statutory cancellation as the equivalent of
rescission. Like a rescission, it terminates the contract and all
its obligations. But unlike rescission, it does not restore the
status quo. Because a rescission does that, it puts the party
injured by fraud, if any, in a position where he suffers no dam-
age. That bars his action for deceit because actual damage is
an element of it. The statutory cancellation does not restore to
the victim of fraud what he parted with. Therefore it cannot
be treated as the equivalent of rescission and should not be at-
tended by the effect, which a rescission has, of barring the ac-
tion in tort for the deceit.28
Decisions subsequent to Olson have continued to apply its
rationale despite the vendee's attempts to circumvent the effect
of statutory cancellation. In International Realty & Securities
Corp. v. Vanderpoe 29 the vendee who was three weeks in de-
26. Olson v. Northern Pac. Ry., 126 Minn. 229, 235, 148 N.W. 67,
70 (1914).
27. The action of fraud or deceit in inducing the entering
into a contract or procuring its execution is not based upon the
contract, but is independent thereof, although it is regarded as
an affirmance of the contract. Hence it is a general rule that a
vendee is entitled to maintain an action against the vendor for
fraud or deceit in the respects mentioned, even though he has
not complied with all the duties imposed upon him by the con-
tract.
Annot., 74 A.L.R. 165, 169 (1931).
28. West v. Walker, 181 Minn. 169, 174, 231 N.W. 826, 828 (1930)
(Stone, J., dissenting).
29. 127 Minn. 89, 148 N.W. 895 (1914). Cf. Graceville State Bank
v. Hofschild, 166 Minn. 58, 206 N.W. 948 (1926) (cancellation statute
applies notwithstanding lack of contractual provision for vendor can-
cellation in case of vendee default); Nelson Real Estate Agency v.
Seeman, 147 Minn. 354, 180 N.W. 227 (1920) (Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil
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fault brought an action claiming vendor fraud and seeking re-
scission and recovery of installments paid. Several weeks later,
the vendor served the statutory notice and, after the expiration
of the 30 days without payment, obtained a cancellation of the
contract. Thereafter the vendee, unable to amend the com-
plaint to change the action from rescission to specific perform-
ance,30 voluntarily dismissed his original action and brought
the present one for specific performance and abatement of pur-
chase price. It was the vendee's contention that the damages re-
sulting from the vendor's fraud had paid and discharged the over-
due installments and thereby removed the default claimed in
the statutory notice.31 The court reiterated that all rights of
the parties under the contract cease at the end of the prescribed
time. As a tender of payment made after the expiration of the
30 days is of no avail, so an attempt to apply a claim for
damages as payment is of no greater effect.
3 2
B. AzLORATION OF THE OLsoN RuL E
There are several ways in which the defrauded vendee
may be able to avoid the logical inconsistency and potential un-
fairness of the Olson rule, but each way provides inadequate
protection. First, if the vendee can establish that he rescinded
the contract prior to default and service of the statutory notice,
he can recover his installments from the vendor even though
the contract was subsequently cancelled under the statute.33
Relief Act cannot be invoked to require refund of down payment as
condition precedent to cancellation).
30. The attempt to amend the complaint was predicated on the
fact that rescission would have failed for laches. The court ruled that
although it strictly observed the election of remedies doctrine, the vol-
untary dismissal of the original rescission action did not bar the
subsequent action for specific performance. The same result would
currently be reached much more easily under notice pleading. See
notes 38-41 infra and accompanying text. Cf. Blythe v. Kujawa, 177
Minn. 79, 224 N.W. 464 (1929).
31. There is support for the vendee's contention:
In the Minnesota cases under consideration the concession
that the vendor had committed a fraud upon the vendee in-
cludes the element of damage thereby suffered by the latter, else
it would not constitute actionable fraud. There are, therefore,
unadjusted rights and liabilities between the parties, upon the
settlement of which depends the question of default. Where the
vendee has a claim against the vendor of this character, he is
not legally in default until the amount of his claim has been de-
termined.
Annot., 74 A.L.R. 165, 173 (1931).
32. See also West v. Walker, 181 Minn. 169, 231 N.W. 826 (1930).
33. The vendee's recovery of payments made will be lessened by
1973]
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Second, if the vendee presents a tenable claim of fraud, he may
recover some of his purchase money in an action for "money
had and received" 34 instituted after statutory cancellation. Fi-
nally, if the vendee institutes an action based on fraud before
the vendor serves notice, the court will enjoin the vendor from
proceeding further under the statute. Inasmuch as the effects
of the Olson rule are clearly quite harsh in some cases, the in-
adequacy in such cases of each of the three "remedies" must
be closely examined.
1. Rescission
The vendee who is free from default may maintain a rescis-
sion action to recover payments already made on the contract
for deed. In Blosick v. Warmbold,3 5 the vendee was induced to
purchase a farm by the vendor's representation that the acreage
was free from quackgrass, Canadian thistles and other noxious
weeds. The vendee took possession but as the summer wore on
it became apparent that the tillage was infested with weeds. In
reaction to the misrepresentation, the vendee notified the vendor
that the contract was rescinded and offered to return the land.
The vendor refused this tender and, as a payment was due and
unpaid the following day, then served the notice of cancellation
under the statute. The court granted rescission for fraud even
though the 30 days had passed without payment and said in dis-
cussing the effect of the statutory notice:
Nor will [vendor's] efforts to cancel the contract by service
of the statutory notice deprive [vendee] of his right to recover
what he had parted with. There was no default at the time of
the service of the notice of rescission. The statutory notice to
the fair rental value of the property during his possession. See notes
23-25 supra and accompanying text.
34. This action at law has been described in two early Minnesota
opinions. The action is in the nature of an equitable remedy to compel
one unjustly enriched at the expense of another to disgorge. Todd v.
Bettingen, 109 Minn. 493, 124 N.W. 443 (1910). In Brand v. Williams,
29 Minn. 238, 239 (1882), the court said:
An action for money had and received can be maintained
whenever one man has received or obtained the possession of
the money of another which he ought in equity and good con-
science to pay over .... There need be no privity between the
parties, or any promise to pay, other than that which results or
is implied from one man's having another's money, which he
has no right conscientiously to retain .... When the fact is
proved that he has the money, if he cannot show a legal or
equitable ground for retaining it, the law creates the privity
and the promise .... It is not necessary . . .that the money
received by the defendant should have been [a] ... sum
... belonging exclusively to plaintiff ....
35. 151 Minn. 264, 187 N.W. 136 (1922).
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cancel the contract upon the ground of the nonpayment of a
monad of interest for the period of three days can avail [the
vendor] nothing in this litigation.36
The court placed obvious emphasis on the fact that the ven-
dee had rescinded the contract prior to his default in payment
and the subsequent statutory notice. As a practical matter,
however, the vendee in Blosick was likely unique in his reaction
to vendor fraud; he gave notice to the vendor and offered to re-
turn the property. Most vendees will not "formally" rescind
but rather will simply withhold payments. Thus, although re-
scission for fraud is one way to avoid the Olson rule, it is avail-
able only to vendees who are well informed of their legal rights.
2. Money Had and Received
In Olson itself, the court suggested that the vendee might
have recovered the money already paid notwithstanding the can-
cellation of the contract. An action at law for money had and
received, it was said, "might be considered virtually the same as
one for rescission and would be governed by the principles
which are applied in equity suits to rescind for fraud."3 7 The
action is one for unjust enrichment and does not depend upon
the contract but rather is based upon unconscionable gain by one
of the parties at the expense of the other.
Although available, the remedy has seldom been pursued;
the most likely explanation is the moribund doctrine of election
of remedies. In those few cases where the action has been dis-
cussed,3 8 the vendee has typically sought other relief such as
specific performance and damages for fraud, and the court has
restricted the pleadings to those claims on the theory that elec-
tion of remedies limits the vendee to one course of action.
3 0
Thus, the vendee who did not explicitly seek money had and re-
ceived at the outset could not plead it at a later time. Minnesota
has since adopted rules of civil procedure premised upon "no-
36. Blosick v. Warmbold, 151 Minn. 264, 268, 187 N.W. 136, 137
(1922) (emphasis added).
37. Olson v. Northern Pac. Ry., 126 Minn. 229, 234, 148 N.W. 67,
69-70 (1914).
38. See, e.g., Houchin v. Braham Inv. Co., 202 Minn. 540, 279 N.W.
370 (1938); West v. Walker, 181 Minn. 169, 231 N.W. 826 (1930).
39. See, e.g., West v. Walker, 181 Minn. 169, 172, 231 N.W. 826, 827
(1930), where the court said:
The complaint in the instant case cannot be construed as
one for money had and received with any better success than in
the Olson case.... In fact [the vendee] is in possession and
insists on retaining it.... (emphasis added).
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tice pleading" which allows liberal amendment and the pres-
entation of inconsistent claims.40 As a result, the procedural
strictures which have frustrated maintenance of the action in
the past 41 should loosen in the future.
Although the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals denied unjust
enrichment for lack of proof in Zirinsky v. Sheenan,'2 that deci-
sion suggests the circumstances in which such an action may be
successful. Where the vendor has received substantial payments
which have not been offset by a commensurate loss of use of and
income from the property, he will be held to a stricter account-
ability for the money "had and received." In other words, as
the down payment and initial installments increase and the ven-
dee's time of possession decreases, the chances of a successful un-
just enrichment action become greater.43  The vendee will not
be able to circumvent the Olson rule but rather will gain some
recovery in spite of the rule. Although the action for money
had and received affords the defrauded vendee some monetary
relief, he will still have been deprived of his property without a
meaningful opportunity to litigate his fraud claim.
3. Injunctive Relief
In Freeman v. Fehr,44 another misrepresentation of quack-
grass case, the vendee brought an action for rescission and re-
turn of money paid on the contract. To protect his position, he
further obtained a temporary injunction against the service
of the statutory notice by the vendor. This was permissible, the
court reasoned, because it would secure the vendee's right to
bring an action for specific performance and damages at a later
time if the present action failed.45 If the rescission action suc-
40. MINN. R. Civ. P. 8.1 (notice); MINN. R. Civ. P. 8.5 (inconsis-
tent claims); MINN. R. Civ. P. 15.01 (liberal amendment).
41. See 2 PMsIG ON MINNESOTA P.EADING § 1796 (4 ed. 1956).
42. 413 F.2d 481 (8th Cir. 1969). By analogizing to contractual
liquidated damage situations, the court suggested that a successful fraud
claim is not a prerequisite to a successful action for money had and re-
ceived. This conclusion is logically compelling, but it is an incorrect
statement of Minnesota law. See Comment, 54 MINN. L. Rsv. 1152
(1970).
43. The vendee in Zirinsky merely deposited the payments with
the vendor and was not to get possession until full payment of the pur-
chase price.
44. 132 Minn. 384, 157 N.W. 587 (1916).
45. If the present rescission action were defeated because of
laches or ratification, the vendee could subsequently elect to affirm
the contract, perform it and sue for damages for the fraud. Under the
Olson rule the second suit could not be maintained if the contract had
been terminated under the statute. To enjoin the service of notice then
[Vol. 58:247
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ceeded, the service of the statutory notice by the vendor would
be an "idle ceremony" 40 because the contract would have al-
ready been terminated by the vendee. However, if no injunc-
tion issued and the contract was cancelled during the pendency
of an unsuccessful rescission action, the vendee would be irrep-
arably harmed by the loss of his right to perform the contract
and to recover damages for the fraud. Freeman appears to be an
escape from the Olson rule but as a practical matter may pro-
vide scant aid since it contemplates that the vendee will antici-
pate service of the statutory notice and its effect on his rights.
However, most vendees will become aware of their legal prob-
lems only after the vendor has served the notice.47
The swath of vendee protection was broadened somewhat
in Folingstad v. Syverson.48  After the vendee brought an ac-
tion seeking damages for vendor fraud and an offset against the
unpaid purchase price, the vendor served the statutory notice
for default on the balance. The vendee countered with a re-
quest that the vendor be enjoined from "proceeding further with
the cancellation." Although the action had been brought prior
to service of notice as in Freeman, the vendee had neglected to
enjoin the service of notice at that time. Because the prior dam-
age and offset action raised doubt about what the final balance
owing would be,49 the court questioned the effectiveness of a
subsequent notice which stated a fixed amount in default under
the contract. 50 The court then distinguished an earlier case5 '
is to assure the alternative remedy. This works no mischief upon the
election of remedies rule. See notes 37-41 supra and accompanying
text.
46. Freeman v. Fehr, 132 Minn. 384, 387, 157 N.W. 587, 588 (1916).
47. In Nolan v. Greely, 150 Minn. 441, 443, 185 N.W. 647, 648(1921), the court refused to set aside the service of notice once it had
been made:
Here the giving of the notice was a fact accomplished, and
from then on the statute was in operation shortening from day
to day the time in which to remove the defaults.
48. 160 Minn. 307, 200 N.W. 90 (1924).
49. Must [vendee] pay $10,000 and interest to [vendors] as
a condition precedent to his maintenance of an action to deter-
mine his claim, which he has a legal right to assert without un-due hindrance or penalty, that he does not owe that much?
Id. at 310, 200 N.W. at 91.
50. The argument that the amount in default is unascertainable
when potentially offset by damages has been rejected where service of
statutory notice precedes the action for damages. See note 31 supra
and accompanying text for criticism of this result. Where the amount
of default is in fact questionable, it is illogical to draw a distinction
based merely upon the chronology of the damage action and the ven-
dor's service of notice.
51. See Nolan v. Greely, supra note 47.
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in which relief had been denied because the vendee sought to
vacate the service of notice or suspend the effect of the notice in
a suit brought after notice had been served. Although the no-
tice was already in effect in Follingstad, the vendee merely sought
to enjoin further proceedings under the notice such as recording
proof of cancellation and proceedings to oust the vendee from
possession. Thus, an injunction will issue only where the ven-
dee commences an action before the vendor serves the notice "
and will lie not against the running of the statute itself, but only
against the vendor's exercise of his rights under the statute.5 3
Once again, if the vendee does not initiate action before the ven-
dor's service of notice, the Olson rule will destroy the vendee's
defense to his default.
IV. CONSTITUTIONALITY
The foregoing discussion points out the abridgement of the
vendee's rights by the statute and the Olson rule. After the
vendor serves the statutory notice, the defrauded vendee can
protect his right to litigate the underlying issue of fraud only
by making those payments specified in the notice and thereby
removing the default.54 If the contract has been terminated by
the expiration of the 30-day statutory period, under the Olson
rule a subsequent fraud action will fail and the vendee will have
lost the right to retain his property.5 5 The recent United States
Supreme Court decisions in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.50
52. To maintain a damage action and avoid the Olson rule, the
vendee must act before the vendor. This race-to-the-courthouse situa-
tion also exists for a rescission action. See note 36 supra and ensuing
text.
53. One case has permitted an injunction in an action commenced
after service of notice. In Craigmile v. Sorenson, 241 Minn. 222, 62
N.W.2d 846 (1954), the vendors had refused the vendee's tender of the
amount in default during the 30 days. A vendee action for declaratory
and other relief was brought and an injunction fashioned as in Foil-
ingstad was allowed. The court's rigid approach to injunctive relief had
to give way where the vendor actively prevented payment of the
amount in default.
54. An injunction against the vendor's exercise of his statutory
rights will lie only where the vendor, by refusing tender of the pay-
ments specified in the notice, has frustrated the vendee's attempt to
remove the default. See note 53 supra.
55. The vendee may be able to reinstate the contract if the ven-
dor has not complied with the technicalities of statutory service; see,
e.g., Enga v. Felland, 264 Minn. 67, 117 N.W.2d 787 (1962); or if the
vendor has waived his assertion of default; see, e.g., Odegaard v. Moe,
264 Minn. 324, 119 N.W.2d 281 (1962).
56. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
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and Fuentes v. Shevin5 raise serious doubts about the con-
stitutionality of this statutory scheme. By cutting off a vendee's
rights if he is not sufficiently informed to obtain a timely in-
junction or to seek rescission before default, the present can-
cellation procedure works a denial of due process because the
property is "taken" without a hearing.
In Sniadach the Supreme Court struck down the Wisconsin
summary prejudgment garnishment procedure as a violation of
due process. The statute allowed the garnishor to freeze the de-
fendant's wages immediately and serve a summons and com-
plaint upon the defendant within 10 days thereafter. Although
the defendant would retain the wages if successful on the merits
in the subsequent suit, "in the interim the wage earner is de-
prived of his enjoyment of earned wages without any opportunity
to be heard and to tender any defense he may have, whether
it be fraud or otherwise."53 The Court noted that while such
a summary procedure might be sustained in "extraordinary situ-
ations,"59 no special state or creditor interest compelled this gar-
nishment procedure and the statute was not narrowly drawn to
meet such situations. The Court arguably based its decision on
the particular type of property involved and the dire conse-
quences of the deprivation of wages. As a result, several lower
courts later confined Sniadach to its facts and held that it was
a unique case "involving a specialized type of property present-
ing distinct problems in our economic system."0 0 Other courts
looked beyond the kinds of property involved and viewed
Sniadach as setting forth general principles of due process in
the context of prejudgment proceedings. 01
57. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
58. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 339 (1969).
59. Id. at 339.
60. Brunswick Corp. v. J & P, Inc., 424 F.2d 100, 105 (10th Cir.
1970). Cf. Black Watch Farms, Inc. v. Dick 323 F. Supp. 100 (D. Conn.
1971) (prejudgment attachment constitutional); Reeves v. Motor Con-
tract Co., 324 F. Supp. 1011 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (garnishment unconstitu-
tional only when applied to wages); American Olean Tile Co. v. Zim-
merman, 317 F. Supp. 150 (D. Hawaii 1970) (garnishment of wages
only); Young v. Ridley, 309 F. Supp. 1308 (D.D.C. 1970) (mortgage
foreclosure constitutional); Termplan Inc. v. Super. Ct., 105 Ariz. 270,
463 P.2d 68 (1969) (garnishment of wages only).
61. See Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972) (repos-
session and disposition of collateral by a secured party); Collins v.
Viceroy Hotel Corp., 338 F. Supp. 390 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (innkeeper's lien
laws); Lebowitz v. Forbes Leasing & Fin. Corp., 326 F. Supp. 1335 (E.D.
Pa. 1971) (foreign attachment); Kim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D.
Cal. 1970) (innkeepers' lien laws); Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co.,
315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970) (replevin); Santiago v. McElroy, 319
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In Fuentes the Supreme Court put to rest the notion that
the right to due process hinges on the nature of the property
in question. There several vendees under conditional sales con-
tracts assailed the constitutionality of Florida and Pennsylvania
replevin statutes which provided for seizure by a state agent of
a person's possessions upon the ex parte application of one who
claimed a right to the possessions and posted a bond for twice
their value. Neither statute required that the possessor of the
property be given notice or an opportunity to challenge the sei-
zure at any kind of prior hearing.0 2 The Court found that
both procedures were unconstitutional in failing to provide for
hearings "at a meaningful time"63 and that the nature of the
property interests involved 6 4 was relevant not to the right to
notice and hearing but only to the form of the notice and hear-
ing required by due process. 5
The Sniadach and Fuentes decisions clearly suggest a consti-
tutional deficiency in Minnesota's statutory procedure for can-
cellation of contracts for deed. The vendee does receive notice
that his rights under the contract are in jeopardy. However,
once the vendor has served the statutory notice of default, the
vendee is afforded no meaningful opportunity to present a de-
fense to the loss of those rights. The statute itself provides no
means to suspend the contractual termination other than by ten-
der of the payments which are contested. Similarly, the Minne-
sota court has not recognized the vendee's right to enjoin termi-
nation during the 30-day statutory period. 0 If the contract has
F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (distraint); Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258,
486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42, (1971) ("claim and delivery" law); Ran-
done v. Appel. Dept. of Super. Ct., 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 709 (1971) (prejudgment attachment); Jones Press, Inc. v.
Motor Travel Serv., Inc., 286 Minn. 205, 176 N.W.2d 87 (1970) (garnish-
ment).
62. In Florida a hearing was required after seizure. In Pennsyl-
vania it was up to the vendee to initiate an action to contest the seizure.
63. This was the primary question as framed by the court. Fuen-
tes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972).
64. The vendees' respective contracts covered, inter alia, a stove
and stereo; a bed and table; and a child's clothes, furniture and toys.
65. 407 U.S. 67, 90.
[A narrow reading] of Sniadach and Goldberg reflects the
premises that those cases marked a radical departure from es-
tablished principles of procedural due process. They did not.
Both decisions were in the mainstream of past cases, having
little or nothing to do with the absolute 'necessities' of life but
establishing that due process requires an opportunity for a hear-
ing before a deprivation of property takes effect.
Id. at 88.
66. See notes 47-53 supra and accompanying text.
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been effectively cancelled under the statute, the vendee can still
refuse to relinquish possession of the property. In this situa-
tion, the vendor must bring an action for unlawful detainer,67
and a hearing will be held. However, the scope of an unlawful
detainer hearing is restricted to legal defenses, and the vendee
cannot raise his equitable defense of fraud.0 8 Even if equitable
defenses were allowed, the Olson rule would dictate that the
vendee had lost his defense to the default when the 30 days ex-
pired. Thus, the unlawful detainer "hearing" is clearly not the
"hearing at a meaningful time" envisioned in Fuentes. A
hearing that can be had only when the vendee has lost his de-
fense is no hearing at all.
Instructive in the consideration of this constitutional short-
coming is the pre-Fuentes decision in Young v. Ridley 0 where
a federal district court upheld the constitutionality of the Dis-
trict of Columbia mortgage foreclosure statute. The statute
permitted extrajudicial foreclosure by public auction after a 30-
day notice of default without a hearing for the homeowner
prior to the sale. The court upheld the statute both because
extrajudicial foreclosure was permitted only when the instru-
ment contained a power of sale clause and because during the 30-
day statutory notice period the homeowner could secure in-
junctive relief pending determination of the merits of his de-
fense to the default.
- The first basis for the decision, the homeowner's prior con-
sent to summary foreclosure, involves a waiver of constitutional
rights. This was impugned in Fuentes where the Supreme Court
held that a contractual waiver of due process rights must be
"voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly" made, that both par-
ties must be "aware of the significance" of the waiver clause,
and that the waiver must not result from "a case of unequal
bargaining power or overreaching."70 This strict approach to the
waiver of constitutional rights in a conditional sales contract
should apply with equal force when the waiver appears in a
mortgage or a contract for deed. Form contracts which bury
such waivers in lines of standardized fine print are commonly
used in Mlinnesota.7 1 It is improbable that the vendee is aware
67. M. STAT. §§ 566.01-.17 (1971).
68. See notes 80-83 infra and accompanying text.
69. 309 F. Supp. 1308 (D.D.C. 1970).
70. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 94-95 (1972). The Court relied
on its recent outline of the relevant considerations in D.H. Overmeyer
Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972).
71. The basic forms are found in Uniform Conveyancing Blanks,
19731
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
of the existence of the waiver let alone its significance. More-
over, Fuentes suggests that even an obvious and explicit waiver
may be ineffective where the contract is one of adhesion. The
vendee in a contract for deed does not wield the same bargain-
ing clout as does the homeowner in a mortgage. The vendee
may be unable to secure a mortgage and thus may depend upon
the contract for deed either because he has virtually no credit
rating or because he can afford but a small down payment. 2 In
such case, the vendor more likely dictates rather than nego-
tiates the terms of the contract.
The second basis for the Young holding was that the home-
owner could obtain injunctive relief during the statutory no-
tice period. Moreover, the Sniadach situation in which the de-
fendant was deprived of the use of his property without a prior
hearing was inapposite. In Young the mortgagor was not de-
prived of the use and possession of his property prior to public
sale and could secure an injunction of the right to that sale pend-
ing a hearing of his defense to the default. The existence of
such relief may render the District of Columbia foreclosure stat-
ute constitutional but the validity of the statute depends on a
two-step process. The Minnesota cancellation procedure makes
the first step in that it does not deprive the recalcitrant ven-
dee of the use and possession of his property prior to a hearing,73
but it stops there. Since no hearing is allowed prior to the loss
of the defrauded vendee's most valuable defense, the hearing
prior to the loss of possession becomes a mere formality.
V. REFORM
Before attempting to bring the statutory cancellation pro-
cedure within equitable and constitutional bounds, one must face
the threshold question of whether the procedure should be re-
tained at all. The law sanctions the installment land contract
as an alternative to the purchase money mortgage even though
they apparently serve the same function. The reason generally
given to justify the contract for deed is that it permits the pur-
Forms 54-60, authorized by MiNr. STAT. § 507.07 (1971) and printed
in MINN. STAT. ANN. following Chapter 507.
72. This is one of the reasons for the popularity of, and indeed the
necessity for, the contract for deed. See Warren, California Install-
ment Land Sales Contracts: A Time For Reform, 9 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 608,
625 (1962). On the inequality of bargaining power, see Vanneman,
Strict Foreclosure on Land Contracts, 14 Mum. L. Rzv. 342 (1930).
73. See note 66 supra and accompanying text.
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chase of real estate with a smaller down payment by one with a
less solid credit history than would be acceptable to the seller in
a mortgage transaction.74 There is a general policy to promote
a home-owning public, and state recognition of the contract for
deed is one way to realize this purpose. 5 Thus, any discus-
sion of a procedure for cancellation of the contract must include
a balancing of the different interests involved to avoid frustra-
tion of this legislative design. The vendee wishes to retain this
form of "easy credit" in the purchase of a home and at the same
time needs to be protected against arbitrary cancellation by the
vendor.76 The vendor wants to get his property back quickly if
the vendee defaults in his payments.7 7 Indeed, if the vendor
did not have the advantage of swift cancellation to compensate
for giving up possession for a small down payment, either the
down payment would be increased commensurate with the greater
risk s or the contract for deed would virtually disappear.79 It
is this vendor interest in a speedy remedy for default which
must be accommodated to the requirements of due process and
the vendee's right to be made whole if he has been defrauded.
74. See Rudolph, The Installment Land Contract as a Junior
Security, 54 Micm. L. REv. 929, 948 (1956).
75. Another approach would be to sanction the use of trust in-
dentures as an alternative to the conventional mortgage transaction.
Thus, in upholding the constitutionality of a three-acre classification
for trust indenture use, the Montana supreme court recited the Montana
legislature's policy statement:
Because the financing of homes and business expansion is es-
sential to the development of the state of Montana, and because
such financing ... has been restricted by the laws relating to
mortgages of real property, and because more such financing
of homes and business expansion is available if the parties can
use security instruments and procedures not subject to all the
provisions of the mortgage laws, it is hereby declared to be the
public policy of the state of Montana to permit the use of trust
indentures ....
Great Falls Natl Bank v. McCormick, 152 Mont. 319, 322, 448 P.2d 991,
993 (1968).
76. Many states have enacted such protections. See, e.g., Aimz.
REv. STAT. A~rN. § 33-741 (1956) (duration of notice increases with the
increase in vendee equity); IOWA CODE §§ 656.1-.2 (1946) (30 days);
LA. REV. STAT. AiqN. § 9:2941 (West 1950) (45 days); MAnYLAm RuNEs
or PocE EU Rule W 79 (1971) (30 days); ND. CENT. CODE §§ 32-18-01,
04 (1960) (one year).
77. The vendor would not readily enter into a contract if fore-
closure were by public sale as with mortgages or if the statutory no-
tice period were materially extended. See Rudolph, supra note 74.
78. See Note, Minnesota Land Contract Law in Action, 39 MNN.
L. REv. 93, 104-10 (1954).
79. See 12 KAN. L. REv. 475 (1964).
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Both the constitutional deficiency of the statutory cancel-
lation procedure and its failure to adequately protect the de-
frauded vendee can be met in two ways: (1) the hearing in
an action for unlawful detainer could be expanded to allow a
meaningful opportunity to present defenses to vendee default;
or (2) the vendee could be granted the right to injunctive re-
lief during the 30-day period and thereby protect his rights pend-
ing adjudication of his defenses to the default.
A. UNLAWFuL DETAINER
At present, the scope of the hearing in an action for unlaw-
ful detainer 0 is too restricted to afford the defrauded vendee the
"hearing at a meaningful time" required by due process. As a
defense to the vendor's action for possession, fraud is insufficient
per se and can be asserted only with the aid of affirmative equi-
table relief such as specific performance.81 However, by statute "
the vendee is limited in unlawful detainer to the presentation of
legal defenses.8 3 Thus, the defrauded vendee is not allowed to
contest the very default upon which is premised the termina-
tion of his contract under the cancellation statute. "The sta-
tute regulating forcible entry and unlawful detainer actions was
80. The unlawful detainer procedure is provided by MiNN. STAT.
§§ 566.01-.17 (1971).
81. Gallagher v. Moffit, 233 Minn. 330, 46 N.W.2d 792 (1951).
82. MINN. STAT. § 488A.01 (1971) denies equity jurisdiction to the
municipal court. In Dahlberg v. Young, 231 Minn. 60, 66, 42 N.W.2d
570, 575 (1950), the court said:
[A] direct examination of [the statutes] indicates that the
legislature . .. had no intention to confer upon the municipal
court the power to exercise affirmative equitable relief in un-
lawful detainer actions. The obvious purpose was merely to ex-
tend the court's jurisdiction in this type of action to cases in-
volving disputes as to the title, which disputes, however, did
not require an exercise of purely equitable relief for their de-
termination. The specific restriction upon the exercise of
equitable jurisdiction is found in the same paragraph ... and if
the legislature had intended a change in that restriction with
regard to unlawful detainers, no doubt it would have used ex-
press language to accomplish that purpose.
83. E.g., (1) adequacy of notice and signature: Robitshek Inv. Co.
v. Wick, 171 Minn. 127, 213 N.W. 551 (1927); Clark v. Dye, 158 Minn. 217,
197 N.W. 209 (1924); First Nat'l Bank v. Coon, 143 Minn. 262,
173 N.W. 431 (1919); (2) waiver by vendor: Odegaard v. Moe, 264
Minn. 324, 119 N.W.2d 281 (1962); Clark v. Dye, 158 Minn. 217, 197
N.W. 209 (1924); (3) adequacy of service: Enga v. Felland, 264 Minn. 67,
117 N.W.2d 787 (1962); (4) real party in interest: Gruenberg v. Saum-
weber, 188 Minn. 568, 248 N.W. 724 (1933); (5) mortgage rather than
contract for deed: Albright v. Henry, 285 Minn. 452, 174 N.W.2d 100




designed to be summary and speedy .. . and does not contem-
plate [what] might work delays.84
This summary nature of the unlawful detainer hearing was
recently approved by the United States Supreme Court in Lind-
sey v. Normet85 where a tenant had tried to assert the landlord's
failure to maintain the premises as a defense to his default. The
Court found that Oregon's unlawful detainer statute which lim-
ited triable issues solely to the tenant's default was constitu-
tional.8 6 However, the Oregon scheme also provided that when
an equitable matter is interposed, the unlawful detainer action
is stayed pending determination of the equitable issue. A simi-
lar interposition and stay is recognized in Minnesota; 1 the ven-
dee will be allowed to secure an injunction of the unlawful de-
tainer action pending the outcome of his separate suit. If the
vendee prevails on the merits of his fraud claim, such result pro-
vides a fraud defense which is sufficient per se and which can
be asserted in the vendor's action for possession.
If the unlawful detainer hearing is to be used to save the
constitutionality of Minnesota's cancellation statute, one of two
changes must be made. The first approach requires both that
the legislature expand the scope of the hearing itself to encom-
pass not only legal but also equitable defenses to vendee default
and that the Supreme Court overrule Olson so that the equitable
defense of fraud is not lost to the vendee at the expiration of
the 30-day notice period. The second approach requires only
that the Supreme Court overrule Olson so that the vendee can
fairly litigate his fraud claim after having obtained an injunc-
tion staying the unlawful detainer proceedings. Broadening
the unlawful detainer hearing seems to be the less desirable al-
ternative. The utility of the action to both the vendor and les-
sor would be defeated by any reduction of its present speed and
simplicity. Moreover, the Supreme Court has recognized" that
the state has a strong interest in isolating one limited action for
84. Lilienthal v. Tordoff, 154 Minn. 225, 227, 194 N.W. 722 (1922).
The court was there considering an order remitting the cause to the
trial court for the purpose of moving for a new triaL
85. 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
86. The Court has twice held that it is permissible to segre-
gate an action for possession of property from other actions aris-
ing out of the same factual situation that may assert valid legal
or equitable defenses or counterclaims.
Id. at 67.
87. See William Weisman Holding Co. v. Mfiler, 152 Minn. 330,
188 N.W. 732 (1922).
88. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
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possession so that the bulk of cases may be handled with mini-
mal drain on state funds and judicial energy. Overruling Olson
seems the better approach. If an injunction staying unlawful
detainer proceedings is to be allowed pending a hearing on the
vendee's suit for fraud, that hearing must be one at which the
vendee can fully litigate his claim. Olson clearly denies the
right to such a hearing by holding that the vendee is deemed to
be without a contract and consequently without equitable re-
lief once the 30-day statutory period has run. If Olson is over-
ruled, the vendee will be permitted redress for vendor fraud
and, more importantly, will have the opportunity required by
due process to defend against his default.
B. INJJcTiVE RELIEF
Constitutional objection to the cancellation procedure would
be met if the vendee were allowed the right to injunctive relief
from the running of the statutory period pending a hearing on
his defenses to the default.8 9 The defrauded vendee could then
sue for damages or abatement of the purchase price and yet re-
tain his right to perform the contract should the fraud action
fail.90 In the event the fraud action were unsuccessful, the ven-
dor's financial interest would be protected by the injunctive bond-
ing procedure.9 1 If the vendee successfully established the exist-
ence of fraud, the vendor could not shield himself behind the
statutory termination as in the past. Injunctive relief would
thus obviate the doctrinal ambiguity of the Olson rule, pro-
vide redress for the defrauded vendee's injury and avoid the
denial of due process inherent in a summary prejudgment depri-
vation of property. The Minnesota legislature could follow North
Dakota's lead and make statutory provision for this remedy. 2
However, even a judicial recognition of the relief, especially un-
der the aegis of saving constitutionality, would not significantly
diminish the vendee protection intended by the legislature in
the existing statute.
89. See the discussion of Young, supra notes 69-73 and accompany-
ing text.
90. The vendee has in the past been denied an injunction except
where the injunction is sought in a suit instituted prior to the notice of
default. See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
91. MNnu. STAT. § 585.02 (1971) permits the injunction; MINN.
STAT. § 585.04 (1971) provides that injunctive relief must be condi-
tioned upon protection of the defendant. See also Northwest Hotel
Corp. v. Henderson, 257 Minn. 87, 100 N.W.2d 493 (1959).
92. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-18-06 (1960) authorizes injunctive relief.
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C. REQUIEmENT AND SCOPE OF HEARING
The United States Supreme Court has said that the right to
be heard "has little reality or worth unless one is informed that
the matter is pending and can choose for himself whether to ap-
pear or default, acquiesce or contest. 09 3 This suggests that a hear-
ing, even if it allows the vendee to present full defense to his
fraud, will not meet the requirements of due process where the
vendee has the burden of initiating the action. In other words,
the vendor may not be allowed to cancel a contract for deed with-
out first providing the vendee an opportunity to object to the
cancellation and to contest the default at an adequate hearing.
If this is a correct interpretation of due process requirements,
the allowance of injunctive relief either during the 30-day notice
period or before or during an action for unlawful detainer would
not save the constitutionality of the cancellation statute because
such injunctive action must be initiated by the vendee. How-
ever, expansion of the scope of the unlawful detainer hearing
would accomplish this purpose because the vendor must bring
such an action.
The Court has not squarely faced the issue of whether the
vendor-creditor must initiate a judicial proceeding before the
recovery of possession of property under a contract, but the
broad language of recent opinions supports this interpretation.
In discussing the Pennsylvania replevin statute, the Fuentes4
Court was particularly disturbed by the fact that the law did not
require that there ever be a hearing on the merits of the con-
flicting claims to possession of the replevied property. The
creditor was not statutorily obliged to initiate a court action to
effect repossession. To secure even a post-seizure hearing, the
debtor had to initiate a lawsuit himself.9 5 However, the Court
did not decide whether a debtor's mere opportunity to bring suit
in protection of his rights would comport with due process, but
rather described the kind of prior hearing required:
The nature and form of such prior hearings, moreover, are
legitimately open to many potential variations and are a sub-ject, at this point, for legislation-not adjudication. Since the
essential reason for the requirement of a prior hearing is to
prevent unfair and mistaken deprivations of property, however,
it is axiomatic that the hearing must provide a real test.6
93. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314
(1950).
94. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
95. Id. at 77-78.
96. Id. at 96-97.
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In the context of the defrauded vendee, it seems clear that the
"real test" can be met only by a full adjudication of the vendee's
claim of fraud as a defense to default.9 7 It is equally clear that
a hearing of this scope, whether in an action for unlawful de-
tainer or otherwise, would frustrate the vendor's interest in a
summary recovery of the property. If the vendor is required to
go to court whenever he seeks statutory cancellation, the contin-
ued existence of the contract for deed as a form of financing is
questionable.98 On the other hand, it may be constitutionally
impermissible to require a hearing only when the vendee assumes
the burden of initiating a lawsuit.
If the statutory procedure will pass constitutional muster
only where the vendor is required to initiate a judicial proceed-
ing prior to the cancellation of a contract for deed, there likely
can be no accommodation of the requirements of due process
and the viability of the contract for deed. It would be anoma-
lous indeed if the due process protection afforded the vendee
were so stringent that vendors would no longer use the contract
for deed as a form of real estate financing. No court has yet
held that placing the burden of initiating a suit in protection of
property rights upon the debtor is constitutionally prohibited.
This latter solution appears to be the only way to satisfy the
practicalities of the contract for deed transaction.
To support a relaxation of the requirements of due process
in the procedure for the cancellation of the contract for deed,
one must look to the practical consequences of a stringent due
process standard. In the analogous mortgage situation, these
consequences are illustrated by the legislative history of a pro-
posed amendment to the District of Columbia mortgage fore-
closure statute. The amendment would have required notice
to the mortgagor rather than
[a judicial foreclosure proceeding in every case which would re-
quire] service of process, time for an answer, a hearing, and
other procedural steps, resulting in delays of several months if
97. "The opportunity to be heard must be tailored to the capaci-
ties and circumstances of those who are to be heard." Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254, 268-79 (1970) (emphasis added). The majority opinion in
Sniadach did not consider the nature of the required hearing, but Jus-
tice Harlan in a concurring opinion suggested that notice and hearing
should be "aimed at establishing the validity, or at least the probable
validity, of the underlying claim against the alleged debtor before he
can be deprived of his property or its unrestricted use." 395 U.S. 337, 343
(emphasis in original).
98. See note 79 supra and accompanying text.
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there is no objection, and quite possibly as much as several
years if contested.
This delay would unduly restrict the legitimate financial
institution in transacting its normal business. The committee
believes that there is no reason to penalize the reputable
lender. The purpose of this legislation is to correct the flagrant
abuses of a few dishonest firms preying on District homeown-
ers. ...
In addition to being time consuming, a court foreclosure
would be a costly process for all parties involved. The prop-
erty owner would have additional costs in the way of legal
fees and court costs .. which costs would reduce the owner's
equity in the property. The lender must face the prospect of
property deterioration and a decrease in value as well as being
required to advance money toward protection of its security
which may never be recovered. The additional costs imposed
on the lending institution by requiring that they obtain a court
order for each foreclosure would ultimately be borne by the
borrowers.
In making a mortgage loan the lender considers not only
the credit of the borrower but the security offered for the loan
as well. If the security is less available because of a more
restricted foreclosure procedure, the lender takes this into ac-
count in determining if the loan is to be made and the loan
terms to be offered. Thus, a court foreclosure procedure may
restrict the flow of mortgage money in the District of Colum-
bia.99
Congress determined that a 30-day notice to the mortgage
borrower prior to foreclosure by sale would protect the borrower
against the dishonest lender without burdening the honest mort-
gagee or jeopardizing the availability of mortgage money. Con-
stitutional objections to the summary nature of the foreclosure
procedure were met by a provision for injunctive relief pending
adjudication of the mortgagor's defense to his default: 10 0
The committee amendment would require proper notification of
the owner of the encumbered property well in advance of the
proposed date of sale. This would allow the property owner
ample time to seek remedies under existing law. The obligor
now has adequate remedy by seeking injunctive relief in the
U. S. district court if he has grounds on which to defend himself
against the threatened foreclosure.' 0 '
It would seem that there must be a trade-off between the
vendee's interest in the provision of a hearing prior to every
99. Senator Mansfield's reading of the purpose of the bill into the
Congressional Record, 114 CONG. REc. 22314 (daily ed. July 19, 1968)
(emphasis added). See also 114 CONG. REc. 28884 (daily ed. October 1,
1968) (remarks of Rep. Dowdy).
100. See the discussion of Young v. Ridley, supra notes 69-73
and accompanying text.




attempted cancellation of a contract for deed and the vendor's
interest in the speedy recovery of his security in every case of de-
fault. The vendee-initiated suit to retain his property sacrifices
little of these interests to the continued existence of the contract
for deed. The delay caused by injunctive relief would not un-
duly restrict the legitimate vendor in transacting his normal bus-
iness; such relief is aimed at the correction of flagrant abuses
by the few dishonest vendors. The requirements of due process
should not be so inflexibly imposed that the contract for deed
will no longer be available as an alternative to conventional
mortgage financing.
VI. CONCLUSION
If due process permits placing upon the vendee the burden
of initiating a lawsuit to obtain a meaningful hearing, and this
Note has suggested that it must, the allowance of injunctive re-
lief will save the constitutionality of Minnesota's cancellation
statute. If such relief is granted either during or after '0 2 the
30-day notice period, the court will protect the vendee from the
loss of the right to fully defend against his default. This ap-
proach to reform would minimize any decrease in the attractive-
ness of the contract for deed as a form of land conveyance. Pro-
viding a meaningful hearing in this manner would not affect
the vendor's speedy remedy for vendee default in most cases.
The fact is that most vendees stop payments under a contract
for deed either because they cannot afford to continue or be-
cause they lose interest in retaining the property, not because
they have been defrauded and want to assert that or some
other meritorious claim. Whatever dampening effect such re-
form would have on due process would be more than outweighed
by the importance of maintaining a viable extrajudicial cancel-
lation procedure.
Summary extrajudicial cancellation cannot be retained as a
viable procedure if due process demands that the vendor pro-
vide a hearing whenever a contract for deed is to be cancelled.
The legislature would be compelled to expand the scope of the
unlawful detainer hearing to allow equitable defenses to de-
fault or, alternatively, to devise a new procedure whereby
a similar kind of hearing would be provided solely in the con-
102. In this case, the Minnesota court must reject the harshness




tract for deed context. 103 In this case, it seems most difficult to
accommodate the vendor's interest in a speedy recovery proce-
dure and the vendee's right to an opportunity to be heard at a
meaningful time. Due process would require that the speed and
efficiency of a summary extrajudicial cancellation procedure
give way to the cumbersome but fair machinery of a trial.
103. The Supreme Court in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 97 n.33
(1972), said:
[L] eeway remains to develop a form of hearing that will mini-
mize unnecessary cost and delay while preserving the fairness
and effectiveness of the hearing in preventing seizures of ! prop-
erty] when the [vendor] has little probability of succeeding in
the merits of the dispute.
1973]

